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Abstract
This paper introduces an approach based on control theory to model, analyze and select optimal security policies for Moving
Target Defense (MTD) deployment strategies. A Markov Decision Process (MDP) scheme is presented to model states of the
system from attacking point of view. The employed value iteration method is based on the Bellman optimality equation for optimal
policy selection for each state defined in the system. The model is then utilized to analyze the impact of various costs on the
optimal policy. The MDP model is then applied to two case studies to evaluate the performance of the model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The essence of Moving Target Defense is security through diversification, in which the configurations and properties of
a target system are dynamically and randomly changed [1]. This creates a complex and unpredictable moving target while
making it computationally expensive for attackers to exploit the target system. While it increases the attack cost and degrades the
attackers’ incentives, moving target defense can also impose some cost on the defenders and thus on the network infrastructure.
Therefore, it is important to incorporate cost in the computational factors that may affect the effectiveness of MTD with respect
to the type of attacks, environment, deployment, and employed MTD strategies [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Another limiting factor of the implementation of MTD in practice is due to the security policies that are often defined across
the network, on which the prospective MTD system would be deployed. These security policies not only regulate actions that
are allowed or prohibited under certain circumstances but might also cause some conflicting issues with actions permitted by
the MTD implementation.
Game theoretical approaches model the interactions between defenders and attackers, as the players of a game, and thus
adopt the strategies usually employed by players. In such games, each player tries to determine the optimal strategy in order to
maximize their incentives. Assuming that all players (defenders and attackers) in the game are rational, they tend to choose the
best possible strategies to maximize their expected payoffs while minimizing their costs at each move. When the game reaches
a state called “Nash Equilibrium,” at which no player could increase their payoffs by changing strategies, the solution to the
game at this state is considered to be optimal. However, in cyber defense the assumption that attackers would make rational
decisions at each move to maximize their payoffs might not hold completely, mainly because attackers would try unpredictable
actions to breach the system.
A Markov model is a stochastic model used to describe the state transition of a system. When combined with game theory,
a Markov game model can describe the interaction between defenders and attackers and thus it would be possible to analyze
the possible outcome of the system when it is in a certain state. The Markov chain game model is descriptive and useful for
defenders by which necessary information is provided to them in order to choose the best strategy for the next move. However,
the key challenge is that network defenders in some situations may not have access to the needed time to make informed
decisions with respect to the feedback received from a model. As a result, a model is preferable that can make decisions to
enforce proper security policies (i.e., actions) in certain circumestances.
To meet this challenge, this paper proposes to use Markov Decision Process (MDP) to model the state transition of a system
in which the interaction between defenders and attackers is modeled through transitions from one state to another. The model
incorporates the costs of players’ actions and the existing security policies in a system using Bellman Optimality Equations in
order to identify the optimal defense strategies or policies under different scenarios. The model enables the defender to analyze
the impact on the policy change by the cost of strategy. This paper completes our preliminary work on modeling MTD using
MDP [7] as follows:
• Presents a more comprehensive Markov model to embrace additional dynamic nature of networks,
• Investigates the impact of different costs on the selection of optimal policy,
• Evaluates the proposed model through two use cases to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the model.
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2(a) when the “Wait” action is taken.
(b) when the “Defend” action is taken.
(c) when the “Reset” action is taken.
Fig. 1: State transition probabilities/costs of the MDP model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes Markov Decision Process game model and Bellman
Optimality Equation. Section III presents the model simulation setup, simulation results, and implications of findings. Section
IV concludes the paper and sketches the future research directions.
II. A MARKOV DECISION PROCESS-BASED MODEL
The interaction between a defender and an attacker is abstracted out as a discrete, finite-state, and finite-action Markov
Decision Process (MDP). The model is formulated as a 4-tuple (S,A, P,R), where:
– S is the finite set of states.
– A is the finite set of control actions.
– P is the probability of transition from one state to another upon performing an action.
– R is the expected immediate rewards received after state transition associated with the control action performed.
Figures 1a–1c illustrate the state transition probabilities and costs under each control action. Furthermore, Figure 2 depicts
the big picture of the proposed MDP-based model by combining Figures 1a–1c. In the proposed model, the security defense
mechanism is abstracted out into four states (S) and three control actions (A), as follows:
S ∈

N System Running Normally
T System Being Targeted
E System Being Exploited
B System Being Breached
(1)
A ∈ {Wait,Defend,Reset} (2)
A. State Transitions
Two scenarios are presented to help better understand the state transition in the proposed model:
Scenario 1 : Under the “Wait” control action, state N may transition to state T with the probability values of PT . It may
also return to itself with the self-transition probability of 1− PT (i.e., the sum of all probabilities transitioning out of a state
under a control action must be equal to 1).
Scenario 2: Under the “Wait” control action, a transition from state T to state E occurs with probability PE and the self-
transition of state T occurs with probability 1− PE . Both transitions incurs a cost denoted by CT . Therefore, the immediate
reward for each transition is R− CT .
In an analogous way, similar scenarios can be developed for the “Defend” and “Reset” control actions.
3Fig. 2: The complete MDP model with state transition probabilities and costs [7].
B. Key Concepts of MDP
In a typical MDP, the most critical property that must be satisfied is known as the Markov property. This property states
that the effects of an action taken in any state depend only on that state and not on the prior history or knowledge.
A policy pi in MDP is a mapping function from states to actions: pi : S → A. In other words, a policy dictates each process
(i.e., agent) to take certain actions while being in a specific state.
The value function, denoted by V pi(s), represents the expected value of the received rewards, starting from state S = s and
following policy pi. It is also called state value function or utility function and it is computed through the following equation:
V pi(st) = Epi[Rt+1 + γRt+2 + γ2Rt+3 · · · |S = st]
= Epi[Rt+1 + γ(Rt+2 + γRt+3 + · · · )|S = st]
= Epi[Rt+1 + γV pi(st+1)|S = st]
(3)
where:
– st denotes the state S at the time interval t.
– Epi is the expected value of total rewards gained by following policy pi.
– Rt+1 is the reward gained at state S at t+ 1.
– γ is the discount factor.
– V pi(st) denotes the value function in the state S at t.
By omitting the subscript of the time interval, the general form of the utility function can be represented as follows:
V pi(s) =
∑
s′∈S
P (s, pi, s′)[R(s, pi, s′) + γV pi(s′)] (4)
where:
– P (s, pi, s′) is the transition probability starting from state s and ending at state s′ after following policy pi.
– R(s, pi, s′) is the expected rewards received after state transition from s to s′ after following policy pi.
– γ is the discount factor.
The discount factor in MDP, denoted by γ ∈ (0, 1), presents the portion of the future rewards that would be lost in comparison
to the present rewards. A smaller γ means the rewards received in the future would worth much less than the present rewards
due to the discount. As a result, the agent should follow the policy and collect the rewards immediately instead of waiting to
collect and claim them in the future.
Finally, an optimal policy pi∗ is a control action a ∈ A that generates the maximum state value function and is expressed
by Bellman Optimality Equation [8]:
V ∗i+1(s) = max
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γV ∗i (s
′)] (5)
where V ∗i+1(s) is the value function in the state S by following the optimal policy. The optimal policy can be obtained by
solving the MDP problem or the Bellman Optimality Equation.
C. Solving MDP
The MDP problem can be solved by using the value iteration method developed by Bellman [8]. The value iteration method
is simple and intuitive. The algorithm of value iteration is listed in Algorithm 1.
The following example demonstrates how to solve the Bellman Optimality Equation using Algorithm 1.
4Algorithm 1 Value Iteration.
1: initialize V0(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S,  = a small positive number.
2: ∆← 0, i← 0
3: repeat
4: For each s ∈ S
5: Vi+1(s)← maxa∈A P (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γVi(s′)]
6: ∆← max(∆, |Vi+1(s)− Vi(s)|)
7: i← i+ 1
8: until ∆ < 
9: Output the policy pi, such that
pi(s)← argmax
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γV (s′)]
As shown in Figure 2, there are three control actions a ∈ {Wait,Defend,Reset} at each state. To find the optimal policy
at a specific state, say state E, we use Equation 4 to calculate the state value under each of the three control actions and
then assign the maximum of the three values computed for the three actions to the state value. The process will be repeated
until V ∗i+1(E) converges, (i.e. V
∗
i+1(E) ≈ V ∗i (E)). At the convergence, the control action corresponding to the maximum state
value will be selected as the optimal policy.
V ∗i+1(E) = max
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P (E, a, s′)[R(E, a, s′) + γV ∗i (s
′)]
← max

P (E, a,E)[R(E, a,E) + γV ∗i (E)]
+ P (E, a,B)[R(E, a,B) + γV ∗i (B)] a = Wait
P (E, a,N)[R(E, a,N) + γV ∗i (N)]
+ P (E, a,E)[R(E, a,E) + γV ∗i (E)]
+ P (E, a,B)[R(E, a,B) + γV ∗i (B)] a = Defend
P (E, a,N)[R(E, a,N) + γV ∗i (N)] a = Reset
After plugging in all variables shown in Figure 2, the Bellman Optimality Equation at state E in our model can be written
as:
← max

(1− PB)[(R− CA) + γV ∗i (E)]
+ PB [(R− CA) + γV ∗i (B)] a = Wait
PD[R+RD − CA − CD)+
γV ∗i (N)] + (1− PD)(1− PB)
[(R+RD − CA − CD) + γV ∗i (E)]
+ (1− PD)PB [(R+RD
−CA − CD) + γV ∗i (B)] a = Defend
(R− CR) + γV ∗i (N) a = Reset
Similarly, we can derive the equations to calculate V ∗i+1(N),
V ∗i+1(T ), and V
∗
i+1(B).
D. Cost Impact on Optimal Policy
The reward that is gained by taking a specific action has a significant impact on the calculation of the optimal policy. Hence,
a defender can control the optimal policy by changing the reward. In our model, we introduce the cost factor and define the
expected reward as the result of the baseline reward R subtracted by the cost incurred by an action “a” during a state transition.
The action can be initiated by an attacker or the defender. For example, an MTD-based action from the defender can incur
the cost CD, an exploitation action from the attacker can incur the cost CE , and a reset action can incur the cost CR. After
plugging these costs into the cost factor, the Bellman equation will be:
V ∗i+1(s) = max
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)[(R− C(s, a, s′))
+γV ∗i (s
′)]
(6)
This equation will allow us to analyze the cost impact on the optimal policy. Several other control theoretic-based problems
can be formulated using MDP (e.g., [9, 10, 11]) in a similar manner.
5(a) Impact of defense cost on state value at state S = E.
(b) Optimal policies as the defense cost increases.
Fig. 3: Defense impact and optimal policy.
III. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
This section presents the results of a simulation with the goal of analyzing the optimal policy in various network attack
dynamics and then evaluating the impact of the cost on deciding about the optimal policy.
A. Network Environment
The initial assumption is that our network is infrequently targeted or exploited by attackers. Therefore, we set the corre-
sponding probability values very low (e.g., PT = 0.2, PA = 0.2). Furthermore, we assume that an MTD defense technique is
actively applied to protect the network: (e.g., PD = 0.6), and the probability of system breach is medium: (e.g., PB = 0.4).
We also assume the baseline reward of the system is R = 10 and the reward received by performing the defense action is
RD = 5. Moreover, the discount factor is fixed and it is set to γ = 0.9.
B. Defense: Cost vs. Optimal Policy
To investigate the impact of defense cost on the optimal policy, we fix the other costs as follows:
– CT = 0.1: the cost incurred by attacker’s reconnaissance (i.e., system being targeted),
– CE = 3: the cost incurred by attacker’s exploitation,
– CB = 4: the cost incurred by system breach, and
– CR = 4: the cost incurred by resetting the system.
We implemented Algorithm 1 with  = 0.001 using Microsoft Excel and calculated the value function for each policy (wait,
defend, reset) at each state S ∈ {N,T,E,B} with different values for the defense costs. Figure 3a shows the state value vs.
the defense cost at state S = E.
Figure 3a demonstrates a clear trend in which the state value decreases as the defense cost increases. However, when the
defense cost exceeds a certain point (i.e., 35% of the total rewards), the state values corresponding to the Wait and Reset
actions stay unchanged; whereas, the state value corresponding to the “Defend” action continues to decrease. This observation
implies that the defense cost does not have impact on these two policies. This behavior can be explained by analyzing Equation
4. Since each value function consists of the immediate reward R and the discounted value of the successor state γV (s′), we
can re-write Equation 4 in a more general form as follows:
V ∗i+1(E) = max

R1 + γ[V
∗
i (E) + V
∗
i (B)] a = Wait
(R2 − kCD) + γ[V ∗i (N)
+ V ∗i (E) + V
∗
i (B)] a = Defend
R3 + γV
∗
i (N) a = Reset
Where:
– R1, R2, R3 are the sum of the immediate rewards of respective value function.
– k is the sum of all coefficients of CD in value function for the “Defend” action.
6For example, when a = Wait, V ∗i+1(E) = R1 + γ[V
∗
i (E) + V
∗
i (B)]. In this equation, the immediate reward R1 is
independent of CD, but γ[V ∗i (E) + V
∗
i (B)] is related to CD when CD is small. However, when CD exceeds a certain value
C∗wait, γ[V
∗
i (E) + V
∗
i (B)] becomes a constant and therefore independent of CD. This pattern holds for the value functions
when a = Defend and a = Reset. As a result, the above equation can be further written in terms of CD:
V ∗i+1,Wait(E) =
{
R1 + β1CD CD < C
∗
wait
c CD ≥ C∗wait
(4a)
V ∗i+1,Reset(E) =
{
R2 + β2CD CD < C
∗
defend
c CD ≥ C∗defend
(4b)
V ∗i+1,Defend(E) =
{
(R3 − kCD) + β3CD CD < C∗reset
R3 − kCD CD ≥ C∗reset
(4c)
With respect to Equations (4a) and (4b), we can reason that when CD is small, both value functions are linear with respect
to CD, but with different slopes. In an analogous way, when CD is large, both value functions remain constant. The value
function for the “Defend” action, however, is always a linear function of CD, but the slope changes when CD exceeds a certain
value, as shown in (4c).
A similar pattern is observable through Figure 3a. It shows that when the defense cost is below a certain value, called the
turning point, the “Defend’ action is the optimal policy. But when the defense cost is above the turning point, the “Reset”
action turns out to be the optimal policy because it generates higher rewards than the other two actions. This optimal policy
shift can be better shown when we plot the optimal state value at each level of the defense cost for state S = E in Figure 3b.
The first 6 data points represent the “Defend” action and the remaining data points show the “Reset” action.
Another interesting finding in Figure 3a is that when the defense cost exceeds a certain value (45% in the simulation
experiment) and if the optimal policy (the “Reset” action) is not available, then the “Wait” action is a better option than the
“Defend” action. It is because the cost of defending the system would be higher than the damage caused by the attacker. Under
this situation, the defender could choose to wait and accept the damage until system reset is available again.
TABLE I: Optimal policies as the defense cost increases.
Cost (%) S = N S = T S=E S = B
5 Defend Defend Defend Reset
10 Defend Defend Defend Reset
... ... ... ... ...
25 Defend Defend Defend Reset
27.5 Defend Defend Defend Reset
30 Defend Defend Reset Reset
35 Wait Defend Reset Reset
40 Wait Defend Reset Reset
... ... ... ... ...
95 Wait Wait Reset Reset
100 Wait Wait Reset Reset
To help the defender choose the optimal policy at a given state, we calculate all optimal policies for all four states with
various defense costs. The results are listed in Table I. At state S = E (marked in bold), for instance, when the defense cost
is less than or equal to 27.5% of the total rewards, the best action to take (a.k.a the optimal policy) is ”Defend”. However,
when the defense cost is above 27.5% of the total rewards, the best action to take will change to ”Reset.” The table confirms
the optimal policy shift behavior as the defense cost increases.
C. Reset: Cost vs. Optimal Policy
In this simulation, we analyze the impact of the reset action cost on the optimal policy. With respect to previous simulation,
the parameters remain unchanged, except CD, which is set to CD = 4. We executed the simulation using the same procedure
as described in Section II-C.
The results are plotted in Figures 4a and 4b. As shown in Figure 4a, when the cost of reset action increases, all state values
decrease implying that the reset cost has impact on all three policies. In other words, the greatest impact on the policy will be
achieved if the underlying system is reset. Conversely, it has the least impact on the policy if the system is in defence mode.
Unlike Figure 3a for “defense”, the impact for reset cost is not stabilized. Employing similar technique presented in Section
II-C, this pattern can be explained by rewriting Equation 4 in terms of the reset cost CR.
Equations (6a), (6b), and (6c) show that all value functions are linear in terms of CR with different slopes. The slopes
change once CR exceeds a certain value.
7(a) Impact of reset cost on state value at state S = E. (b) Optimal policy changes as the reset cost increases.
Fig. 4: Reset impact and optimal policy.
(a) Impact of exploitation cost on state value at state S = E. (b) Optimal policy changes as the exploitation cost increases.
Fig. 5: Exploitation Impact and optimal policy.
Figure 4a also shows a similar optimal policy shift as in the previous simulation (i.e., defense) in that when the reset cost
is below the turning point, the “Reset” action is the optimal policy. However, when the reset cost is above the turning point,
the “Defend” action turns out to be the optimal policy. Figure 4b is plotted to demonstrate this optimal policy shift. The first
6 data points represent the “Reset” policy; whereas, the remaining data points represent the “Defend” policy.
V ∗i+1,Wait(E) =
{
R4 + β4CR CR < C
1
R
R4 + β5CR CR ≥ C1R
(6a)
V ∗i+1,Reset(E) =
{
R5 + β6CR CR < C
2
R
R5 + β6CR CR ≥ C2R
(6b)
V ∗i+1,Defend(E) =
{
(R6 − CR) + β7CR CR < C3R
(R6 − CR) + β8CR CR ≥ C3R
(6c)
A similar finding in this simulation is that when the reset cost exceeds a certain value (i.e., 65% in this experiment) and if
the optimal policy (the “Defend” action) is not available somehow, then the “Wait” action is better than the “Reset” action. It
is because the cost of resetting the system is much higher than the damage caused by the attacker. In other words, if for any
reason a defense action is not available, then it would be better to just accept and absorb the damage (i.e., do nothing) than
resetting the system.
D. Exploitation: Cost vs. Optimal Policy
Similar to the previous simulations, the parameters remain unchanged, except CE , which is set to CE = 4. We analyze the
impact of the cost incurred by attacker’s exploitation on the optimal policy. We run this simulation using the same procedure
as described in Section II-C.
The results are plotted in Figure 5a and 5b. These figures exhibit similar trends as observed through the previous simulations.
We also plot the optimal policy with respect to the defense and exploitation costs to show how the optimal policy shifts in
different network environment.
Figure 6a visualizes the optimal selection of policies. For example, if a combination of the defense and exploitation costs
falls within the area on the top layer (i.e., high defense and high exploitation costs), then “Reset” will be the optimal policy.
On the other hand, if the combination falls within the left bottom corner (marked in blue: high defense but low exploitation
costs), then “Wait” will be the optimal policy. Finally, if the combination falls within the triangle-shape area on the middle
layer, then “Defend” will the optimal policy.
8(a) With respect to the defense
cost and the exploitation cost.
(b) With respect to the defense
cost and the reset cost.
Fig. 6: Optimal policy.
(a) Decoy-based MTD. (b) SCIT-based MTD.
Fig. 7: Optimal policies in case studies.
E. Case Studies
We demonstrate how to apply our model to two existing Moving Target Defense techniques: 1) Decoy-based MTD, and 2)
Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT). It is important to note that the goal is to qualitatively analyze the feasibility of
these two techniques and not their effectiveness.
1) Decoy-based MTD: A decoy system is a phony platform with appealing appearance but fake data and credentials that
is developed for the purpose of trapping unauthorized users. These types of systems are usually used to study the attacker’s
exploitation patterns in order to protect real targets. Decoy-based MTD is one of the newest ideas, in which decoy hosts are
mixed with the protected target hosts on the network. Decoy hosts may confuse attackers by providing fake data and thus
they slow down the pace of attacks towards the real target host. Meantime, the defender can gain additional valuable time to
prepare for defending against the next attack.
To achieve this goal, first, the configurations of each decoy system need to be similar to the target host so that it becomes
hard to distinguish the decoy system from the main operational one. Second, the ratio of the target hosts to the decoys must
be very low, for example 1 : 10, 000 as recommended by the NCLYS 2009 [12]. However, research shows that the ratio of
1 : 99 [2] is still effective for some attacks.
It is reasonable to assume each host on the network to employ a similar defense mechanisms so that each host looks
legitimate and indistinguishable. Furthermore, the ratio of the target hosts to the decoys is kept at least 1 : 10, 000. With
respect to these two assumptions, we observe that:
1) The total defense cost is the sum of each host’s defense cost. As a result, the defense cost of a large-scale decoy-based
MTD can be very high.
2) When the configuration of the target host is changed, all decoys must be reset and cloned to match the new configuration.
Therefore, the reset cost of the decoy-based MTD can also be very high.
3) Each decoy is loaded with fake data and accounts. Hence, the cost of a decoy breach will be very low if not negligible.
For the same reason, the exploitation cost is also very low.
After plugging in the parameters in our simulation, we plot the optimal policy with respect to the defense and rest costs
as shown in Figure 7a. We can observe that when both the defense and reset costs are high, the optimal policy is “Wait.” In
reality, however, this may not be acceptable. Therefore, unless there is some way to reduce the defense cost or the rest cost,
our model shows decoy-based MTD might not be a viable defense technique.
2) Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT): SCIT [13] periodically rotates an array of virtual machines to reduce the
exposure time of the protected server with the aim of disrupting potential attacks. According to the literature, the rotation
9frequency is within minutes and VM reset happens at each rotation, incurring a reset cost. The reset cost is not discussed as
a factor for the effectiveness of the technique. Therefore, we performed a simulation similar to the one reported in this paper
and plotted the results in Figure 7b.
As Figure 7b indicates, only when either the reset cost is low or the exploitation damage (cost) is high, the optimal policy
is “Reset.” For example, in a mission-critical infrastructure where the potential exploitation damage might be very high, it is
preferable to periodically reset the system to disrupt potential attacks, then SCIT might be a viable option. On the other hand,
if with new technology, the cost of resetting and reloading a VM can be reduced, then SCIT might be adopted.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed to use finite-state, finite-action, and stationary Markov Decision Process to model the interaction
between a defender and an attacker. We investigated three possible defense strategies (wait, defend, and reset) for each of the
four system states and used Bellman Optimality Equation to mathematically define the optimal policy. By solving the Bellman
Optimality Equation, we were able to find the optimal policy when the system was in a specific state. Various simulation
experiments were conducted to demonstrate how the optimal policy would shift when cost change. The optimal policy shift
can help defender to make right decision at various situation. We also applied our model in two existing MTD techniques and
case studies to evaluate the feasibility of the two MTD techniques.
We plan to include some quantitative cost estimation methods in our model to fine tune the cost analysis of our research. We
also plan to extend our model to Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) and compare the accuracy of the
two models. Another research opportunity is to utilize the big data research to estimate the transition probabilities of different
control actions in our model in a real-world dataset using techniques such as deep learning algorithms [14, 15] and techniques
based on evidence theory [16, 17]. Also, formal techniques can be used in conjunction with stochastic approaches to model
the MTD problem [18, 19].
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